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The logic of proofs is known to be complete for the semantics of proofs
in PA. In this paper we present a refinement of this theorem, we will show
that we can assure that all the operations on proofs can be realized by
feasible, that is PTIME-computable, functions. In particular we will show
that the logic of proofs is complete for the semantics of proofs in Buss’
bounded arithmetic S12.
1 Introduction
In [Art01] the logic LP was shown to be arithmetically complete with respect to
the semantics of proofs in PA. In this paper we extend this result to S12. Due to
the fact that in [Art01] most calculations and constructions are done outside of
the theory in question (PA there and S12 in this case), such an extension might
seem straightforward. However, closer inspection of the proof reveals a step
which fails for sufficiently weak theories and a refinement is therefore necessary.
Another motivation for a more refined version of the arithmetical complete-
ness theorem is as follows. Recently LP has been applied in the field of epistemic
logic [AN05][Art04]. In particular, LP can express, using its proof terms, how
hard it is to obtain certain knowledge. In other words, LP has a tool for tackling
the logical omniscience problem. However, the length of a proof term can only
be a good indication of the complexity of the evidence it represents when the
operations that occur in it are feasibly computable. In this paper we show that
LP is complete for exactly such a semantics. Namely, each proof term represents
a PTIME-computable function.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the logic LP. In
Section 3 we discuss S12, the formalization of syntax and provability in S
1
2, the
interpretation of LP in S12 and show that LP is complete with respect to this
interpretation. The proof is a refinement of the one given in [Art01] for the
interpretation of LP in PA.
It is worthwhile of mentioning that very little actual reference is made to
the theory S12. Hence the phrase ‘bounded arithmetic’ instead of S
1
2 in the title.
∗Research supported by CUNY Community College Collaborative Incentive Research
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Basically all we require from the arithmetical theory is that we have access to
a fixed point lemma, can formalize syntax and can construct a proof predicate
that satisfies the Hilbert-Bernay-Löb derivability conditions. S12 is (one of) the
weakest theories for which this is known to be possible.
Finally the author would like to thank Professor Sergei Artëmov and Walter
Dean for useful suggestions and remarks.
2 Logic of Proofs
LP has a long history and many variations. Starting in [AS93][Art94] with its
most basic version up to [AN05] where LP is mixed with various modal logics.
In the mean time various results are shown ranging from complexity questions
[KB05][Kuz00] to the development of semantics [Mkr97][Fit05] and tableau sys-
tems [Ren04]. Here we consider the version from [Art01]. An important feature
of this logic and its arithmetical completeness theorem is its ability to give a
complete arithmetical semantics to S4 via its realization theorem. For an ex-
tensive overview of LP we refer the reader to [AB04].
The language of LP consist of the following. We have countably many propo-
sitional variables p1, p2, . . ., countably many proof variables x1, x2, . . . and count-
ably many axiom constants c1, c2, . . . The following definitions show how we can
construct more complex expressions.
Definition 2.1 (LP-terms). We define LP-terms as follows.
• Axiom constants and proof variables are terms,
• If s and t are terms then so are s + t, s · t and !t.
Definition 2.2 (LP-formulas). We define LP-formulas as follows.
• ⊥ and any propositional variable is a formula,
• If A and B are formulas then so is A → B,
• If A is a formula and t is a term then t:A is a formula.
Definition 2.3 (LP). As axioms we take all instances of the following schemata.
A0 “Propositional logic”,
A1 t:A → A,
A2 s:(A → B) → t:A → (s·t):B,
A3 s:A → (s + t):A ∧ (t + s):A,
A4 t:A →!t:(t:A).
A5 c:A, c an axiom constant and A an instance of A0-A4.
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The set of theorems of LP is obtained by closing the set of axioms under modes
ponens.
Definition 2.4 (Constant specification). A constant specification in a set
of pairs 〈c, F 〉 where c is a proof constant and F an instance of one of A0−A4.
With LPCS we denote the fragment of LP, where A5 is restricted to c:A for




CS → A ⇔ LPCS ` A.
Let X be a finite set of formulas. Let T (X) = {t | for some A, t:A ∈ X}.
We say that X is adequate when
• X is closed under subformulas,
• X is closed under single negation,
• If t ∈ Sub(T (X)) and A ∈ X then t:A ∈ X.
Clearly any finite set of formulas can be extended to a finite adequate set of
formulas. Also notice that when X is adequate, then Sub(T (X)) = T (X).
We say that a set of formulas Γ is inconsistent if for some X1, . . . , Xk ∈ Γ
we have LP ` ¬X1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Xk. A set is consistent when it is not inconsistent.
We say that a set Γ is maximal consistent in X when Γ ⊆ X, Γ is consistent
and if Γ ( Γ′ ⊆ X, then Γ′ is inconsistent.
Lemma 2.5. If Γ is maximal consistent in X then for every ¬A ∈ X we have
A ∈ Γ or ¬A ∈ Γ.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that A 6∈ Γ and ¬A 6∈ Γ. Then both Γ∪{A}
and Γ∪ {¬A} are contained in X, properly extend Γ and are thus inconsistent.
So there are X1, . . . , Xk ∈ Γ ∪ {A} and Y1, . . . , Yn ∈ Γ ∪ {¬A} such that LP `
¬X1 ∨ · · · ¬Xk and LP ` ¬Y1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Yn. By the consistency of Γ we find
i, j such that A = Xi and ¬A = Yj . W.l.o.g. we assume i = j = 1. But
then LP ` ¬X2 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Xk ∨ ¬Y2 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Yn, and thus Γ is inconsistent. A
contradiction.
The following lemma is an immediate corollary to Lemma 2.5
Lemma 2.6. Let X be adequate and let Γ be maximally consistent in X. Then
1. If A,A → B ∈ Γ then B ∈ Γ,
2. If t:A ∈ Γ then A ∈ Γ,
3. If s:(A → B) ∈ Γ, t:A ∈ Γ and s · t ∈ T (X) then (s · t):B ∈ Γ
4. If s:A ∈ Γ or t:A ∈ Γ then s + t ∈ T (X) implies (s + t):A ∈ Γ
5. If t:A ∈ Γ and !t ∈ T (X) then !t:(t:A) ∈ Γ
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Proof. As an example let us show Item 4. Suppose s:A ∈ Γ and s + t ∈ T (X).
By adequateness of X we have (s + t):A ∈ X. Since X is closed under single
negation we have ¬(s + t):A ∈ X. By Lemma 2.5 we thus have ¬(s + t):A ∈ Γ
or (s + t):A ∈ Γ. In the first case Γ would be inconsistent, which is not so and
thus (s + t):A ∈ Γ as required.
Notice that in the above two lemmas Γ is not necessarily finite. If we choose
X finite and Γ maximally consistent in X, then Γ is finite as well. In [Art01] an
explicit algorithm is given that, given a formula A such that LP 6` A, constructs
a finite Γ that satisfies Lemma 2.6 such that ¬A ∈ Γ.
3 Arithmetical interpretation
In this section we introduce the fragment of arithmetic S12 [Bus86][Kra95][Bus98],
the formalization of syntax and provability in S12 and the interpretation of LP
in S12. The discussion on S
1
2 is basically meant to fix the notation, for a detailed
treatment of the subject see [Bus86][Bus98].
3.1 Bounded arithmetic
Bounded arithmetic was introduced by Parikh in his famous paper [Par71] (see
also [Bus99]), where he formulated a first-order theory PB that is now known
as I∆0. The core motivation was to build a theory that somehow captured
the informal notion of feasibility and it did so in the sense that I∆0 does not
guarantee the existence of too fast growing functions like, for example, the
exponential function 2x.
As was already realized by Parikh, I∆0 seemed to weak to intensionally
formalize its own syntax. A slightly stronger theory I∆0 + Ω1 was shown in
[PW87] to be able to do this. Just as I∆0, I∆0 + Ω1 does not guarantee
the existence of a function of exponential growth rate. (It was later shown
by Solovay that a great deal, in any case enough for the Gödel incompleteness
theorems, could already be done in I∆0.)
In this paper we will use the approach of [Bus86]. In [Bus86] the theory S2,
a conservative extension of I∆0 + Ω1, and its fragments Si2 were formulated.
The theories Si2 are first-order theories in the language L = {+,×, b 2c, | |, ]}.
The intended meaning of + and × is as usual. bx2 c is the bitwise shift-right
operation, |x| is the length of the binary representation of x and the intended
meaning of x]y is 2|x||y|.
A quantifier in a formula is bounded if its of the form ∀x ≤ t or ∃x ≤ t,
where t is a term. We say that the quantifier is sharply bounded if t is of the
form |t′|. The classes of formulas Σbi are defined as follows.
• A formula is Σb1 if all quantifiers are bounded and all universal quantifiers
are sharply bounded.
• A formula is Πb1 if its negation is Σb1.
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• The class of formulas Σbi+1 is the least class that contains Σbi ∪ Πbi and
is closed under ∧, ∨ and bounded existential quantification and sharply
bounded universal quantification.
• The class of formulas Πbi+1 is the least class that contains Σbi ∪ Πbi and
is closed under ∧, ∨ and bounded universal quantification and sharply
bounded existential quantification.
In addition we define
• A formula is ∆bi if it is both Σbi and Πbi .
As it turns out, this hierarchy has close relations to the polynomial time hier-
archy. For example, the Σb1 definable sets are precisely the NP sets and thus
a statement like Σb1 6= Πb1 (that is NP 6=co-NP) is, unlike its counterpart in the
arithmetical hierarchy, a difficult open questions.
All the (axiomatizations of the) theories Si2 contain a basic set of axioms
BASIC, defining the recursive properties of the functions in the language. The
theory Si2 is then axiomatized over BASIC by the polynomial induction scheme
for Σbi formulas φ:
φ(0) ∧ ∀x ≤ y(φ(bx
2
c) → φ(x)) → φ(y).
The intuition behind this scheme is that in order to verify φ(x) for some x, then
we can do this in |x| (that is a linear) number of steps. (The theory S2 has no
restriction on what formulas can be used in the polynomial induction scheme.)
From now on we mainly focus on S12.
• A formula φ is Σb1 in S12 if for some Σb1 formula σ we have S12 ` φ ↔ σ.
• A formula φ is Πb1 in S12 if for some Πb1 formula π we have S12 ` φ ↔ π.
• A formula φ is ∆b1 in S12 if there is a Σb1 formula σ and a Πb1 formula φ
such that S12 ` π ↔ σ and S12 ` φ ↔ σ.
Of course, in S12 can proof the polynomial induction scheme for any formula that
is Σb1 in S
1
2.
An important relation of bounded arithmetic with complexity theory is as
follows.
Theorem 3.1. If σ(x, y) is a Σb1 formula such that S
1
2 ` ∀x∃!yσ(x, y). Then
σ(x, y) defines the graph of a PTIME-computable function.
For a proof of this theorem, and its reverse: every PTIME-computable func-
tion has a Σb1-definition that is provably total in S
1
2, see [Bus86][Kra95].
One of the fundamental theorems of [Par71] projects to S12 as follows (see
[Bus98]).
Theorem 3.2 (Parikh’s Theorem). Let σ(x, y) be a Σb1 formula such that
S12 ` ∀x∃yσ(x, y). Then there exists a term t such that S12 ` ∀x∃y ≤ t(x)δ(x, y).
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Since the exponential function majorizes any term of S12, Parikh’s theorem
implies that exponentiation does not have a provably total Σb1 definition.
One further fundamental result is as follows. Let f be a new function symbol
and let φ(x, y) be a Σb1 formula such that S
1
2 ` ∀x∃!yφ(x, y). Let Σbi (f) and S12(f)
be defined exactly as Σb1 and S
1
2 but in the language L∪{f} (in particular f may
be used in bounding terms and induction schemes) and S12(f) has an additional
axiom f(x) = y ↔ φ(x, y).
Theorem 3.3. Si2(f) is conservative over S
a
2 nd any Σ
b
i (f) formula is S
i
2(f)
equivalent to a Σbi formula.
In more informal terms, Σbi definable functions can be freely used. A similar
statement holds for ∆b1 definable predicates. For a proof see [Bus98].
3.2 Formalization of syntax
First some notation. Elements from N are printed in boldface: n, m etc. A
sequence x1, . . . , xn is usually written as x. The Gödel number of some syntactic
object ∫ is denoted by p∫q. For exact details on such a coding we refer the reader
to [Bus86].
A simple but important definition is the canonical representation (numeral),




S(S(0)) ·m if n = 2m
S(S(S(0)) ·m) if n = 2m + 1
We can define a Σb1 function num(x) in S
1
2 such that for any n ∈ N we have
num(n) = pnq.




S12 ` sub(pφ(y, x)q, pxq, ptq) = pφ(y, t)q. (1)
Using such functions one can proof a fixed point theorem [Bus98].
Lemma 3.4. For any formula φ(x, y) there exists a formula ε(x) such that
S12 ` ε(x) ↔ φ(x, pε(x)q).
From now on we will not make distinction between numerals and num-
bers (that is, we systematically confuse numerals with elements of the standard
model).
In what follows we let isProof(x) be a ∆b1-formula that defines the codes of
proofs. It is well known that there exists a ∆b1 formula Proof(x, y) for which we
have the following.
S12 ` φ ⇔ N |= ∃xProof(x, pφq). (2)
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Moreover there exist PTIME computable functions ⊕, ⊗ and e for which the
following holds.
N |=Proof(x, pφq) ∧ Proof(y, pφ → ψq) → Proof(y ⊗ x, pψq), (3)
N |=Proof(x, pφq) ∨ Proof(y, pφq) → Proof(x⊕ y, pφq), (4)
N |=Proof(x, pφq) → Proof(e(x), pProof(x, pφq)q). (5)
3.3 Arithmetical interpretation of LP
Any ∆b1 formula Prf(x, y) that satisfies (2) will be called a proof predicate. If it
in addition comes with functions ⊕, ⊗ and e that satisfy the conditions (3), (4)
and (5) that way say that it is a normal proof predicate. We say that a structure
〈Prf(x, y),⊕,⊗, e, ∗〉
is an arithmetical interpretation (which we also denote by ∗) when Prf(x,y)
is a normal proof predicate with the functions ⊕, ⊗ and e. Moreover, ∗ is a
mapping from propositional variables to sentences of S12 and from proof variables
and proof constants to numbers.
Given an arithmetical interpretation 〈Prf(x, y),⊕,⊗, e, ∗〉, we can extend the
map ∗ to the full language of LP as follows.
• (s · t)∗ = s∗ ⊗ t∗, (s + t)∗ = s∗ ⊕ t∗ and (!t)∗ = e(t∗),
• (A → B)∗ = A∗ → B∗,
• (t:A)∗ = Prf(t∗, pA∗q).
3.4 Arithmetical completeness
For now we focus on LP∅. We show that LP∅ is arithmetically complete. A
more general version, for arbitrary constant specifications, will be proved as an
corollary in Section 3.5.
Apart from a formalization of the syntax of S12 in S
1
2 we simultaneous assume
a disjoint formalization of the syntax of LP. So for any LP formula or term θ
we have a code pθq and from this code we can deduce (in S12) that it is indeed
the code of an LP object (and not an S12 object).
Theorem 3.5. LP∅ ` A iff for any arithmetical interpretation ∗ we have that
S12 ` A∗
The proof of this theorem is what constitutes the rest of this section. Sound-
ness is a direct consequence of the definition of a normal proof predicate and the
fact that A∗ is ∆b1 for any ∗. To show completeness assume that LP∅ 6` A. Let
X be some adequate set such that ¬A ∈ X and let Γ be maximal consistent in
X such that ¬A ∈ Γ. (In particular Γ is finite.) We will construct a proof predi-
cate Prf(x, y), PTIME operations on codes of proofs ⊕̃, ⊗̃ and ẽ, and a mapping
∗ from propositional variables to sentences of S12, and from proof variables and
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proof constants to N such that, (when ∗ is extended to the full language of LP∅
as explained above) S12 ` A∗ for all A ∈ Γ.
Let us first decide on what objects should serve as ‘proofs’. To begin with,
all usual proofs are ‘proofs’. That is all sequence of formulas, each of which is
an axiom of S12, or can be obtain by an inference rule from earlier formulas in
the sequence. This way the left to right direction of (2) is easily satisfied. As
an extra source of ‘proofs’ we will use the finite set of LP terms T (X). The
theorems of a ‘proof’ t ∈ T (X) will be the set {A | t:A ∈ Γ}.
We now wish to formalize the contents of the last two paragraphs. Let us
suppose that we have a formula Prf(x, y). We define a translation from LP
formulas A and LP terms t to S12 sentences A
† and numbers t† as follows.
1. p† ≡ ppq = ppq, if p ∈ Γ and p† ≡ ppq 6= ppq otherwise,
2. t† = ptq, for any proof term t,
3. (A → B)† ≡ A† → B†,
4. (t:A)† ≡ Prf(t†, pA†q).
To carry out the proof as in [Art01], we would like to construct a function
tr(p, f) which, given a code p of a normal proof predicate Prf(x, y) and a code
f of an LP-formula F gives us the code of the S12 sentence F
†. There is some
difficulty constructing a Σb1 definition of such a function over S
1
2.
Fact 3.6. There exists a sequence F0, F1, F2, . . . of LP formulas such that for
any S12 term s(x), there exists n ≥ 0 such that pF †nq > s(pFnq).
A proof of this fact can be found in the appendix. By Parikh’s theorem
[Kra95], such a function cannot be shown total in S12. Since we only need pF †q
for only finitely many F ’s, (namely those F ∈ X) the following suffices. Let
subx,y(p, z1, z2) be a Σb1 definable and provably total function which satisfies
(see (1) above)
subx,y(pφ(x, y)q, pt1q, pt2q) = pφ(t1, t2)q.
As usual, we write →̇ for the Σb1 definable and provably total function that
satisfies
pφq→̇pψq = pφ → ψq.
For each F ∈ X we define with induction on F a ∆b1-formula φF (p, x), defining
the graph of tr(p, pFq), as follows.
• If F ≡ ⊥ then
φF (p, x) ≡ x = p0 6= 0q
.
• If F ≡ p ∈ Γ then
φF (p, x) ≡ x = pppq = ppqq
.
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• If F ≡ p 6∈ Γ then
φF (p, x) ≡ x = pppq 6= ppqq
.
• If F ≡ F0 → F1 then
φF (p, x) ≡ ∃x0x1 ≤ x(φF0(p, x0) ∧ φF1(p, x1) ∧ x = x0→̇x1).
• If F ≡ t:F ′ then
φF (p, x) ≡ ∃x′ ≤ x(φF ′(p, x′) ∧ x = subx,y(p, ptq, num(x′))).
Let Prf(x,y) satisfy the following fixed point equation (see Lemma 3.4, also
recall that Γ is finite).
S12 ` Prf(x, y) ↔ Proof(x, y) ∨
∨
t:F∈Γ
(φF (pPrf(x, y)q, y) ∧ x = ptq) (6)
For briefity we put
T (x) ≡
∨
{x = ptq | t ∈ T (X)}
φF (u) ≡ φF (pPrf(x, y)q, u)
With induction on F one easily shows that for all F, G ∈ Γ we have
S12 ` φF (y) ↔ y = pF †q (7)
and
F 6≡ G ⇒ F † 6≡ G†. (8)
Lemma 3.7. Prf(x, y) is ∆b1 in S
1
2
Proof. From (7) one easily derives that for each F ∈ Γ, φF is ∆b1 in S12.
Lemma 3.8. For all F ∈ X we have F ∈ Γ implies S12 ` F † and F 6∈ Γ implies
S12 ` ¬F †.
Proof. Induction on F .
Case F ≡ p. In this case F † is a true ∆b1-sentence when F ∈ Γ, and thus F
is provable. When F 6∈ Γ, then it is a false ∆b1-sentence and thus ¬F is provable.
Case F ≡ t:F ′. We have that φF ′(pF ′†q) is provable. If F ∈ Γ then
Prf(ptq, pF ′†q)(= (t:F ′)†) is provable. If F 6∈ Γ then by (8) we have that
φG′(pF ′†q) is provably false for any t:G′ ∈ Γ. Since ptq is never the code of a
‘real’ proof in S12 we also have that Proof(ptq, pF ′†q) is provably false and thus
Prf(ptq, pF ′†q)(= (t:F ′)†) is provably false.
Case F ≡ F0 → F1. If F ∈ Γ, then F0 6∈ Γ or F1 ∈ Γ. In either case we
obtain from (IH) that F † is provable. If F 6∈ Γ then both F0 ∈ Γ and F1 6∈ Γ.
Thus, again, from (IH) we obtain that ¬F † is provable.
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Thus we have that, for each F ∈ Γ, F † is S12 provable. Since Γ is finite, we
can find one single S12 proof that proves them all. So let g be some number such
that for all A ∈ Γ we have
N |= Proof(g, pA†q). (9)
Lemma 3.9. S12 ` ∃xPrf(x, y) ↔ ∃xProof(x, y)
Proof. The right to left direction is clear by (6). For the other direction reason
in S12 and assume that for some x we have Prf(x, y). In the case Proof(x, y) we
are done at once so assume that this is not so. Then by (6) we have
∨
t:F∈Γ
(φF (y) ∧ x = ptq).
For each t:F ∈ Γ we have φF (y) → y = pF †q and thus
∨
t:F∈Γ
y = pF †q.
Since we have ∧
F∈Γ
Proof(g, pF †q)
we conclude that Proof(g, y).
Let π(x) be a function such that for all n and all formulas φ for which
N |= Proof(n, pφq) we have
N |= Proof(π(n), Proof(n, pφq) → Prf(n, pφq)) (10)
Let +, × and ! stand for Σb1 definable functions that takes codes pt0q, pt1q
of LP terms t0 and t1 to codes pt0 + t1q, pt0 · t1q and p!t0q of the LP terms
t0 + t1, t0 · t1 and !t0 resp.
Recall that T (x) defines the codes of the terms in T (X) and that isProof(x)





x⊕ y isProof(x) ∧ isProof(y)
g ⊕ y T (x) ∧ isProof(y)
x⊕ g isProof(x) ∧ T (y)
x+y T (x) ∧ T (y) ∧ T (x+y)
g T (x) ∧ T (y) ∧ ¬T (x+y)





x⊗ y isProof(x) ∧ isProof(y)
g ⊗ y T (x) ∧ isProof(y)
x⊗ g isProof(x) ∧ T (y)
x×y T (x) ∧ T (y) ∧ T (x×y)
g T (x) ∧ T (y) ∧ ¬T (x×y)
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!x T (x) ∧ T (!x)
g T (x) ∧ ¬T (!x)
π(x)⊗ e(x) isProof(x)
And to finish we define the mapping ∗.
1. p∗ ≡ ppq = ppq if p ∈ Γ,
2. p∗ ≡ ppq 6= ppq if S 6∈ Γ,
3. x∗ ≡ pxq, a∗ = paq,
Lemma 3.10. ⊕̃, ⊗̃ and ẽ are PTIME computable.
Proof. All functions and predicates occurring in their definitions are PTIME
computable.
Now we have finished the definition of our translation of LP into S12. The
relation with our preliminary translation is as follows.
Lemma 3.11. If t ∈ T (X) then t† = t∗. If F ∈ X then F † = F ∗.
Corollary 3.12. For all A ∈ Γ we have S12 ` A∗.
Lemma 3.13. Prf(x, y) is a normal proof predicate, that is:
1. N |= Prf(x, pφq) ∧ Prf(y, pφ → ψq) → Prf(y⊗̃x, pψq),
2. N |= Prf(x, pφq) ∨ Prf(y, pφq) → Prf(x⊕̃y, pφq)
3. N |= Prf(x, pφq) → Prf(ẽ(x), pPrf(x, pφq)q).
Proof. Item 1. Suppose Prf(x, pφq) and Prf(y, pφ → ψq) and let z = y⊗̃x.
There are five cases to consider, one for each disjunct in the definition of ⊗̃.
Case 1: If both x and y code ‘real’ proofs then so does z and indeed z codes a
proof of ψ. Case 2: x is the code of some t ∈ T (X) and y codes a ’real’ proof.
In this case Prf(x, pφq) implies by (6), (7) and (8) that φ = F † for some F with
t:F ∈ Γ. By Lemma 2.6 we have F ∈ Γ. So by choice of g we have Proof(g, pφq)
and thus Proof(y⊗ g, pψq). Case 3: The case y is the code of a term s ∈ T (X)
and x codes a ‘real’ proof is similar to Case 2. Case 4: x codes a terms t ∈ T (X)
, y codes a term s ∈ T (X) and s · t ∈ T (X). We find formulas A and B such
that A† = φ, B† = ψ, t:A ∈ Γ and s:(A → B) ∈ Γ. Since s · t ∈ T (X) we get
(s · t):B ∈ Γ. Thus since ps · tq = y⊗̃x we obtain Prf(z, pψq). Case 5: x codes
a term t ∈ T (X) and y codes a term s ∈ T (X) but s · t 6∈ T (X). Again we find
formulas A and B as in Case 4 but now we reason as follows. By Lemma 2.6,
t:A ∈ Γ implies A ∈ Γ and s:(A → B) ∈ Γ implies A → B ∈ Γ. Thus, again
using Lemma 2.6 we obtain B ∈ Γ. By our choice of g we have and since z = g
and ψ ≡ B† we get Proof(z, pψq).
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Item 2 is shown completely similar to Item 1 so let us show Item 3. Suppose
Prf(x, pφq). There are three cases, corresponding to the three disjunct that
make up ẽ, to consider. Case 1: isProof(x). In this case




Proof(π(x), pProof(x, pφq) → Prf(x, pφq)q).
Clearly now Proof(π(x)⊗ e(x), pPrf(x, pφq)q), and thus
Prf(π(x)⊗ e(x), pPrf(x, pφq)q).
Case 2: T (x) and T (!x). In this case
ẽ(x) = !x
And by (6) we have for some t:A ∈ Γ that
x = ptq and φ = A†.




Case 3: T (x) but ¬T (!x). In this case
ẽ(x) = g.
Again we have for some t:A ∈ Γ that
x = ptq and φ = A†.
So (t:A)† = Prf(x, pφq), so by choice of g we have Proof(g, Prf(x, pφq)).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Lemmata 3.7 and 3.9 show that Prf is a proof predicate
and Lemma 3.13 shows that it is normal. Finally Lemma 3.8 shows that, if S12
is consistent, S12¬ ` A∗.
3.5 Axiom Specifications
In this section we abandon the restriction CS = ∅. Let CS be some axiom spec-
ification. We say that an arithmetical interpretation ∗ = 〈Prf(x, y),⊕,⊗, e, ∗〉
meets an axioms specification CS when for any 〈c, A〉 ∈ CS we have S12 `
Prf(c∗, A∗).
Theorem 3.14. LPCS ` A iff for any arithmetical interpretation ∗ that meets
CS we have S12 ` A∗
Proof. Again, soundness is an easy consequence of the definitions. Suppose now
that LPCS 6` A∗. Then LP∅ 6`
∧ CS → A. As we have seen above this gives us
an arithmetical interpretation ∗ such that S12 ` (




Here we will prove Fact 3.6. Obviously a proof of such a fact requires us to be
more precise about the coding of syntax. We will adopt the coding as presented
in [Kra95]. A pair 〈x, y〉 of numbers x and y is coded as follows.




(a + b)2(c + d)2 ≤ 4(a2 + b2)(c2 + d2)
the following lemma is easily shown.
Lemma A.1. For all a, b, (a+b)
2
2 ≤ 〈a, b〉 ≤ 2(a + b)2
Sequences are coded as tuples 〈x, y〉, where x is simply the concatenation
of codes of words and y encodes where in x a word ends and a new one starts
[Kra95]. That we indeed can give an intensional coding of sequences in this way
is not entirely trivial but not of direct interest for our current goal. What is
important for us now (and obvious given the way sequences are coded) is that
if ∫ is a sequence then
If p∫q = 〈x, y〉 then length(∫) ≤ |y| = |x|.
Corollary A.2. If len(s) ≥ 1 then s ≥ b 2len(s)2 c
Proof. Choose a, b such that s = 〈a, b〉. We have 1 ≤ |a| = |b| ≤ len(s) and thus
a + b ≥ 2|a|−1 + 2|b|−1 = 2|a|. Thus b (a+b)22 c ≥ b 2
2|a|
2 c and by Lemma A.1 it
follows that s ≥ b 22|a|2 c.
Corollary A.3. For any N there exists K such that if len(s) ≥ 1 and if for all
i < len(s), (s)i ≤ N then s ≤ 2Klen(s)
Proof. Fix N and choose some K such that for all x ≥ 1 we have 24Nx+1 ≤ 2Kx.
Now pick some s with the properties as stated. Let a, b such that s = 〈a, b〉.
Then |a| = |b| ≤ N len(s). Thus (a + b) ≤ 2|a|+ 2|b| ≤ 22N len(s). By choice of K
we have 24N len(s)+1 ≤ 2Klen(s) and thus the claim follows by Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.4. num(n)(k) ≥ b 2|k|2
n
2 c
Proof. Induction on n. If n = 1 then the bound follows from Corollary A.2 and
the fact that num(k) codes a sequence of length at least |k|. Now suppose the
13














Proof of Fact 3.6: Fix some proof variable x, some propositional variable p and
define F0 = p and Fi+1 = x:Fi. We will show that
pF †nq ≥ num(n)(ppq). (11)
For n = 0 this is clear so assume it to be true for n ≥ 0. We have
pF †n+1q = sub(pPrf(pxq, y)q, pyq, num(pF †nq))
≥ num(pF †nq)
≥ num(n+1)(ppq)
By Lemma A.4 and (11) we obtain pF †nq ≥ 2|ppq|2
n−1. Next we show that for
some K, that does not depend on n, we have
pFnq ≤ 2Kn. (12)
pFnq is nothing more that the code of a sequence of length linear in n. We only
use finitely many symbols. So let N be the maximal code of the symbols used
in the formulas Fn. Corollary A.3 gives us the desired K. Combining the above
we get
pF †nq ≥ 2|ppq|
K√pFnq−1
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[AB04] S. N. Artëmov and L. D. Beklemishev. Provability logic. In D. Gabbay
and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, volume 13,
pages 229–403. Kluwer, 2nd edition, 2004.
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